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Abstract. This paper studies Bayesian equilibrium in a worker
ﬁrm matching problem in which workers choose their human capi-
tal investment and ﬁrms choose wages before the matching process
occurs. Symmetric equilibrium exists, and supports assortative
matching. When the number of traders is large, the highest types
invest eﬃciently, while low types invest too much and receive wages
that are too high in the sense that both the worker and ﬁrm could
have been better oﬀ if they had agreed ex ante on a lower wage and
investment. The environment is then an unusual one in the sense
that large numbers of traders is not enough to support outcomes
close to the competitive equilibrium.
1. Introduction
This paper considers a matching problem with two sided investments.
This means that traders on both sides of the market choose character-
istics that are costly to them in order to inﬂuence the quality of the
partner with whom they ultimately match. There are a couple of recent
papers that illustrate why investment in problems like this remains in-
eﬃcient in equilibrium even when the number of traders on each side
of the market is very large. Peters (2004) examines a model in which
traders on the same side of the market are all identical, and in which
utility isn’t transferable post match. The paper shows that both sides
of the market tend to over invest when there are many traders being
matched. Felli and Roberts (2000) study an environment with trans-
ferable utility and show that ineﬃciency persists with large numbers
of traders, though in their case the ineﬃciency is of the kind usually
associated with the holdup problem, i.e., traders tend to under invest.
This is in sharp contrast to competitive models of the two sided invest-
ment problem, where eﬃciency is guaranteed (Peters and Siow (2002)
or Han (2002)).
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1This paper involves a generalization of the argument in Peters (2004),
which presents the basic over investment argument. Peters (2004) is
restricted to an environment in which all traders on the same side of
the market have the same preferences. As such, it permits only very
limited distributions of investment, and in particular, makes it diﬃ-
cult to address the relationship between non-cooperative equilibrium
and hedonic (fully competitive) equilibrium. The arguments in this
paper borrow from that paper, but are designed to address this rela-
tionship. Investments are ﬁrst determined by Bayesian equilibrium in
a game in which traders’ preferences are randomly drawn from known
distributions. In this way, a rich variety of diﬀerent investments occur
in equilibrium. The ’hedonic’ return to diﬀerent levels of investment
can then be calculated. Sequences of such equilibria are studied as the
number of traders on each side of the market become large in order to
characterize the way the hedonic return changes as traders’ strategic
impact on the outcome disappears.
The results are interesting in a number of ways. First, unlike most
problems of this kind that have been studied in the literature, large
numbers alone do not eliminate the ineﬃciencies associated with strate-
gic play. In a matching problem, the strategic advantage that any
player enjoys is limited by the existence of alternative partners who
are very close substitutes. A worker in a labour market can’t drop
his investment in education because there is likely to be some other
worker who does have education who can take his place. As the num-
ber of traders grows large, this other worker is likely to be a closer
and closer substitute for him. It is tempting for this reason to jump
immediately to a competitive solution. However, the analysis of the
ﬁnite game illustrates that this is not appropriate. The reason is that
the worst workers and ﬁrms retain their strategic advantage as the
market becomes large. The logic is explained in Peters (2004). Some
worker will end up with the lowest investment, no matter how large
the market is. However, this worker will still be considerably better
than the any of the workers who never expected to match in the ﬁrst
place. Assortative matching will mean that the ﬁrm with whom this
worker is supposed to match in equilibrium won’t be able to compete
away any of the better workers in the market. So if this worst worker
cuts investment, the worst ﬁrm really won’t have any alternative but to
hire this worst worker. Since better workers investments are driven up
by the workers below them, this causes investments to fall for higher
types, and the competitive solution must unravel.
The result illustrates one of the diﬀerences between the competitive
approach to markets and the game theoretic approach. The competitive
2approach simply chooses oﬀ equilibrium payoﬀs to support the outcome
that it wants to prevail. In a hedonic equilibrium (Rosen (1974)), the
worst worker in the market thinks that if he cuts investment, the wage
that he receives will fall because he will be forced to match with a lower
wage ﬁrm. The non-cooperative analysis simply points out that there
will not be such a ﬁrm. It tries instead to model the oﬀ equilibrium
payoﬀs in an economically reasonable way. The pre-match investment
problem is a great example of an environment in which this makes a
diﬀerence.
Finally, the non-cooperative analysis of the pre-match investment
problem provides much more than a critique of competitive theory. The
results below illustrate how the competitive solution can be modiﬁed to
account for this change in oﬀ equilibrium payoﬀs. The theorems below
show how to characterize the limits of Bayesian equilibria when there
are many traders by specifying a pair of strategy rules then checking to
see whether the return that each trader type expects by making his best
reply investment is equal to the best reply investment of his hedonic
partner. The hedonic partner of a worker of type y is the ﬁrm of type
π (y) such that the measure of ﬁrms with types better than π (y) is
equal to the measure of workers with types better than y. Strategy
rules that satisfy this condition support allocations that resemble a
truncated hedonic equilibrium as described in Peters (2006).
This limit equilibrium has a number of interesting properties. The
allocation it supports looks very much like a competitive equilibrium
for the best types in the market. They match assortatively, and choose
investments that are bilaterally Pareto optimal. The market return to
investment fully internalizes the externality that leads to the holdup
problem in a bilateral relationship. However, the worst types in the
market behave in a very non-competitive way. Though the Bayesian
equilibrium assures that these low types are assortatively matched, in
the limit, it will appear as if there is a lot of pooling at the lower end
of the market. Many of the lowest types will make nearly the same
investment and be paid nearly the same wage.
However, for most of these types, the investments that they make
will be too large, in the sense that post match, the ﬁrm would have
preferred to pay a lower wage to a worker with a lower level of invest-
ment and the worker would have been more than happy to accept such
a compromise. This prediction about the low end of the market is one
of the testable consequences of this theory. It predicts some thing that
ought to look roughly like a mass point in the distribution of wages and
investments that lies strictly above the minimum wage. For example,
3this is consistent with dual peaks in the distribution of human capital
investment at high school and university level.
It is also possible to make a comparison between the investment and
wage levels that prevail in the limit of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes,
and those that prevail in a simple competitive equilibrium. All worker
types invest more and are paid higher wages in the limits of Bayesian
equilibrium than they are in competitive equilibrium.
2. Fundamentals
The market consists of m ﬁrms and n workers with n > m. Each ﬁrm
has a privately known characteristic x. If is commonly believed that
these are drawn from a distribution F on a closed connected interval
X = [x,x] ⊂ R+. This characteristic measures the value of worker
investment to the ﬁrm. Firms with higher types have higher marginal
value for worker human capital. Similarly, each worker has a type y
that aﬀects his or her investment cost. Again it is assumed that these





⊂ R+. The distributions F and G are both assumed
to be diﬀerentiable, with both F ′ and G′ uniformly bounded above.
Each ﬁrm has a single job that it wants to ﬁll with one worker. Each
worker wants to ﬁll one job. In order to match, ﬁrm i chooses a wage
wi ∈ W ⊂ R+. Each worker j chooses a human capital investment
hj ∈ H ⊂ R+. Workers and ﬁrms are then matched assortatively, with
the most skilled worker (the worker with the highest hj) being hired
by the ﬁrm with the highest wage, and similarly for lower wages and
investments. Ties are resolved by ﬂipping coins.1
Payoﬀs for ﬁrms and workers depend on their characteristic, their
investment or wage, and on the investment or wage of the partner with
whom they are eventually matched. The payoﬀ of a ﬁrm who oﬀers
wage wi and is matched with a worker of type hj is
(2.1) v (xj)hj − wi
where v (xj)is a monotonically increasing function of xj that is bounded
away from 0 on X. The corresponding payoﬀ for a worker whose in-
vestment is hj who ﬁnds a job at wage wi with a ﬁrm of type x is
(2.2) wi − c(hj)τ (yj)
where c is a strictly convex increasing function of hj with bounded
derivative and τ (·) is a decreasing function. Furthermore, marginal
1Since attention is focused on symmetric equilibrium in which all traders use
monotonic strategies, ties occur with zero probability. The tie breaking rule is then
inconsequential.
4costs are assumed to be uniformly bounded in the sense that 0 ≤
∂c(hj)
∂hj < B for all yj ∈ Y , all hj ∈ H, where B is some ﬁnite positive
number.
Assumption 1. The sets H and W are bounded intervals and H ×W
contains all pairs (h,w) such that v (xi)h−y ≥ 0 and w−c(h)τ (y) ≥ 0
for some pair (x,y).
The matching game is a simultaneous move game among all workers
and ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm picks a non-negative wage, each worker pick a non-
negative investment. Then workers and ﬁrms are matched assortatively.
For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms always hire the best available
worker ex post, even if this involves a loss.
3. Bayesian Equilibrium
We begin with an analysis of the Bayesian game.2 In what follows,
h and w refer to strategy rules, ˜ h and ˜ w refer to vectors of size n and
m respectively of realized investments and wages. Similarly ˜ y and ˜ x
are vectors of realized types for workers and ﬁrms respectively, while
yj and xi refer to speciﬁc types. For any vector x ∈ Rn, xk:n means the
kth lowest element of the vector.
Attention is restricted to symmetric equilibrium in which individuals
on the same side of the market all use the same strategy rule. For the
moment assume that these strategy rules are monotonic, so that ties
occur with probability 0. Then the outcome a trader enjoys depends
on his or her rank in the distribution of realized types. Suppose this
rank is k, so that k − 1 of the others have lower types. Then k − 1 of
the others should have lower investments if all workers are using the
same monotonic strategy.
If k ≤ n−m, then there are at least m workers with higher rank, and
they will take up all the positions oﬀered by the m ﬁrms. Otherwise,
the worker will be matched with the ﬁrm whose rank is k − (n − m),
Let h : Y → H be the investment strategy used by workers. A
Bayesian equilibrium for the workers’ investment game is a strategy
2An alternative and very sensible model would involve workers choosing human
capital in the ﬁrst stage, while ﬁrms compete for realized human capital levels ex
post. The main diﬀerence would be that in the latter case workers should realize
that their own investments would aﬀect the equilibrium of the subgame among
ﬁrms. Since we are mostly interested in large games where this eﬀect is small, it
seems sensible to stick the simpler simultaneous game form.
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> 0, then the
worst worker type could cut investment without aﬀecting his rank in
for any array of types of the other workers.
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Under our assumptions, the Lipshitz condition holds, and the diﬀer-
ential equation has a unique solution. Since each of the γ′ functions
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′ (˜ y)d˜ y = w(yi),
where w(yi) is the right hand side of (3.2).
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The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem yield the diﬀerential equation
(3.4) w



















Integrating by parts and using the boundary condition w(x) = 0 gives
the formula









φt (˜ x)E˜ ht+(n−m+1):n
is mean worker investment.
Since the equilibrium strategies are increasing, the worst ﬁrm will
oﬀer the lowest wage with probability 1. It will then match with the
worker who has the n − m + 1st lowest investment among workers. So
h(x) = E˜ h(n−m+1):n, which gives the equilibrium wage function as




′ (˜ x)h(˜ x)d˜ x.
Observe that the functions w(yi) and h(xj) are respectively the ex-
pected wage paid to a worker of type yi when he plays his eqilibrium
strategy, and the expected quality of the worker with whom a ﬁrm
of type xj matches when it plays its equilibrium strategy. Simple re-
arrangement gives the equilibrium payoﬀ of the same worker and ﬁrm
as −
R yi
y c(h(˜ y))h(˜ y)τ′ (˜ y)d˜ y and v (x)E˜ h(n−m+1):n+
R x
x v′ (˜ x)h(˜ x)d˜ x
respectively.
Theorem 2. A Bayesian equilibrium (h,w) exists for which both h and
w are monotonically increasing diﬀerentiable strategy rules.
The proof follows the method in Peters (2004) so we simply out-
line the argument. Begin with arbitrary vectors (he,we) of expected
order statistics for investment and wages and use these to compute
solutions to (3.1) and (3.4). The Lipschitz conditions guarantee that
these solutions exist. These solutions vary (sup norm) continuously as
the parameters (he,we) change. Recompute the vectors of expected
order statistics using the solutions to (3.1) and (3.4). The mapping
from vectors of expected order statistics to expected order statistics
deﬁned this way is continuous in the usual sense. The boundedness of
the set of feasible investments and wages ensures that this is a contin-
uous mapping from a compact set into itself. The existence of a ﬁxed
point is then ensured by the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem.
7We are interested in the hedonic relationships ˆ w(h′) = {w(y′) : h(y′) = h′}
and ˆ h(w′) =
￿
h(x′) : w(x′) = w′￿
that are traced out by the Bayesian
equilibrium of the matching investment game. The basic idea is to
check whether these resemble the hedonic relationship associated with
competitive equilibrium. Of course, this is only likely to be true when
the number of workers and ﬁrms is very large. For this reason we con-
sider the ’limits’ of the various functionals as the number of workers
and ﬁrms becomes large.
Index the game by the number of ﬁrms, m, and suppose that the
number of workers n > m. We want to consider sequences of game like
this chosen such that the limit of the ratio of workers to ﬁrms converges
to k > 1 as m goes to inﬁnity. By Theorem 2, there is for each m a pair
of monotonic and diﬀerentiable Bayesian equilibrium strategies wm and
hm. The equilibria deﬁne hedonic return functions ˆ wm (·) and ˆ hm (·) as
deﬁned above. They are both diﬀerentiable with derivatives bounded
between 0 and the slope of the steepest worker or ﬁrm indiﬀerence
curve on the set H × W. This follows from the fact that the hedonic
return function is tangent to some worker or ﬁrm indiﬀerence curve at
every point in the support of equilibrium distributions. The slope of
the workers’ indiﬀerence curves are all equal to the marginal investment
costs
∂c(h)τ(yj)
∂h which we have assumed to be bounded on H × W. The
implication is that the family of functions ˆ wm is equi-continuous. Then
each sub-sequence of function ˆ wm that has a pointwise limit has a
continuous pointwise limit. The same argument applies to the sequence
ˆ hm. We are interested in the degree to which the pointwise limits of
these function resemble standard hedonic return functions.
To emphasize how the limits of these return functions are unusual, it
is useful to deﬁne them with reference to the weak limits of the Bayesian
equilibrium strategy rules. In ﬁnite matching games, these strategy
rules are continuous, diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and bounded
above for every m from (3.4) and (3.1). By Helly’s compactness theo-
rem, there are then sub-sequences of these strategy rules that converge
weakly to right continuous non-decreasing functions. We will proceed
with a theorem that characterizes the strategy rules h and w that are
candidates to be weak limits of sequences of equilibrium strategy rules.
4. Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium
We now provide a device for characterizing the limits of Bayesian
equilibrium strategy rules. To understand this result, deﬁne y0 to be
the solution to k (1 − G(y0)) = 1. With assortative matching, the
worker with type y0 would be the lowest worker type to be employed
8if there were a continuum of workers of mass k distributed as G, and a
continuum of ﬁrms of mass 1. We refer to the worker of type y0 as the
marginal worker. Let ω (h) be the graph of the marginal worker’s indif-
ference curve through the origin in (h,w) space. This is the indiﬀerence
curve the marginal worker would attain if he made no investment and
was not oﬀered a job.
Deﬁnition 3. A truncated hedonic equilibrium is an investment level
h0 > 0, a strictly increasing function ˆ w : [h0,∞] → W, and a non-
negative constant β ≤ 1 such that




′ : arg max
hi≥h0











′ : arg max
hi≥h0
v (x





(2) the wage ˆ w(h0) satisﬁes







For each y ≥ y0, let π (y) = {x : k (1 − G(y) = 1 − F (x))}. The moti-
vation for deﬁning truncated hedonic equilibrium is the following the-
orem:
Theorem 4. Let {hm,wm} be a sequence of Bayesian equilibrium in-
vestment strategies that converge weakly to a pair of non-decreasing
functions {h,w}. Then there is a truncated hedonic equilibrium (β,h0, ˆ w)
such that h0 = h(y0) and ˆ w(h(y)) = w(π (y)) for each y ≥ y0.
The ﬁrst condition in the deﬁnition of truncated hedonic equilib-
rium looks exactly like a standard hedonic equilibrium as it might be
deﬁned in (Rosen 1974), (Peters and Siow 2002) or (?). We discuss
the relationship with hedonic equilibrium in more detail below. The
main diﬀerence between the two solution concepts is the bound given in
condition 2. To understand this bound, consider a worker who makes
an investment h′ that lies between h∗ (y0) and h(y0) (it is shown in
the appendix that these two must be distinct). This will result in a
match if it is larger than the n−mth order statistic of the other work-
ers’ investments. Let Pr
n
˜ hn−m:n−1 < h′
o
be the probability that this
n − mth order statistic is less than or equal to h′. If the worker does
9get a job and m is very large , she will end up matching with one of
the very low type ﬁrms since every worker whose type is larger than
y0 eventually investments more than h′. The exact wage she gets will
depend on exactly what the order statistic of her investment is, and
what the realized types of the ﬁrms on the other side of the market
happen to be. It is impossible to say much about the wage she will
receive when she matched, even when the number of workers and ﬁrms
is very large. However, this wage is naturally bounded above by the
wage w(x) since the wage she receives cannot exceed the wage oﬀers









Then taking limits, exploiting the idea that the marginal worker has to
be indiﬀerent to all investments between h∗ (y0) and h(y0), and that
the marginal worker matches with her hedonic partner if she makes her
equilibrium investment, gives












The reason this inequality is useful is that the expected quality of
the worst ﬁrms partner when it oﬀers the bilateral Nash wage w∗ is the
expected value of the n−m+1st order statistic of workers investment.
The inequality gives a bound on the distribution of this order statistic,
which bounds the expectation. The constant β in the deﬁnition of
equilibrium provides the appropriate scale factor to account for the
possibility that this expectation doesn’t attain this bound.
5. Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium and Hedonic
Equilibrium
An hedonic equilibrium is simply a competitive allocation for a con-
tinuum of diﬀerent goods. It then has two characteristics, markets
clear, and the resulting allocaiton is pareto optimal. Condition 1 in
the deﬁnition of truncated hedonic equilibrium is a market clearing
condition relative to a competitive return function ˆ w(h), except for
the restriction to upward deviations. A hedonic equilibrium is deﬁned
by using this same market clearing condition, removing the restriction
the workers and ﬁrms choice, and forcing the allocation to be pareto
optimal.









This is the wage investment pair that is bilaterally eﬃcient for the
worst ﬁrm type and the marginal worker type.
Deﬁnition 5. A hedonic equilibrium is a return function ˆ wc (h) that
satisﬁes condition 1 along with the boundary condition ˆ wc (h∗∗) = w∗∗.
An immediate implication of Theorem 4 is the following:
Theorem 6. A necessary condition for a sequence {hm,wm} of Bayesian











∗ (x) ≥ v (x)h
∗∗ − w
∗∗.
This follows immediately from the fact that Bayesian equilibrium strate-
gies converge to truncated hedonic equilibrium, and the fact that Con-
dition 2 in the deﬁnition can only be satisﬁed for some β less than 1 if
the condition of the theorem is satisﬁed.
It is diﬃcult to relate the limits of Bayesian equilibrium to hedonic
equilibrium when this necessary condition is satisﬁed. The reason is
that truncated hedonic equilibrium imposes relatively weak conditions
on outcomes. Diﬀerent values of β support diﬀerent return functions,
for example, and these relate to hedonic equilibrium in diﬀerent ways.
When the necessary condition fails, all truncated hedonic equilibria
relate to the hedonic equilibrium in the same way. As a result, we will
focus on environments where the necessary condition described above
fails. To make the statements of some of the theorems a little less
awkward, we refer to these as regular environments.
Regular environments are no more or less plausible than irregular
ones - regularity refers to the fact that all truncated hedonic equilibrium
have the same properties in regular environments. Whether or not an
environment is regular depends on the shapes of workers’ indiﬀerence
curves (iso proﬁt curves are all linear) and on the distributions of worker
and ﬁrm types. The results we establish below surely apply in some
irregular environments, however the methods provided here cannot be
used to characterize them.
Proposition 7. In every regular environment, and in every truncated
hedonic equilibrium in that environment, every ﬁrm pays a wage that is
higher than it would pay in a hedonic equilibrium. A positive measure
of workers invest h0 and are matched with ﬁrms who pay ˆ w(h0). For
11each of the workers and ﬁrms in this pool, investments and wages are
too high in the sense that any pair in the pool would both be strictly
better oﬀ at a lower wage and investment. All other workers invest the
same amount in both the hedonic and truncated hedonic equilibrium.
Proof. We begin by showing that in the regular case, for any β ≤ 1,
there is a unique investment h0 > h∗∗ consistent with condition 2 in
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Since (h∗∗,w∗∗) maximizes the worst ﬁrm’s payoﬀ conditional on the
marginal worker receiving his outside option, and h0 > h∗∗, it follows
by continuity that there is a pair (h′,w′) with h′ < h∗∗and w′ < w∗∗
such that both the marginal worker and the worst ﬁrm are strictly
better oﬀ with this new wage investment pair.
Finally, for each worker y′ ≥ y0, h(y′) = argmaxhi≥h0 { ˆ w(hi) − c(hi)τ (y′)},
so that in any truncated hedonic equilibrium v (π (yi)) ≤ ˆ w′ (h(y′)) ≤
c′ (h(y′))τ (y′) where h(y′) is the equilibrium strategy of a worker of
type y′ > y0. From the result above, h0 > h∗∗ in a regular environ-
ment, so v (x) < ˆ w′ (h(y0)) < c′ (h(y0))τ (y0). By continuity, there is
a non-degenerate interval of types [y0,y1] for which this is true.
Consider h′ > h0. If some type y′ makes the investment h′ in the
truncated hedonic equilibrium, then
v (π (y






A similar condition holds with respect to the hedonic return function
ˆ wc. Since the function on the right hand side of this last expres-
sion is strictly decreasing in y′ while the function on the left hand
side is strictly increasing, there is at most one value for y′such that
v (π (y′)) = c′ (h′)τ (y′). As a consequence if h′ > h0 is an investment
that is made by some worker type in both the hedonic and truncated
12hedonic equilibrium, then h′ is made by the same type in each case,
and ˆ w′ (h′) = ˆ w′
c (h′). Since ˆ w(h0) > w∗∗ and ˆ w′ (h′) = ˆ w′
c (h′) for each
h′ > h0, it follows that ˆ w(h′) > ˆ wc (h′) for each investment h′ > h0
that is made along the equilibrium path in both equilibrium. ￿
This proposition provides a comparison between hedonic equilibrium
and truncated hedonic equilibrium in regular environments. The trun-
cation caused by the competition at the lower end of the wage and
investment distribution drives up wages and generates ineﬃcient out-
comes for many worker and ﬁrm types.
An important property of this theorem is the apparent ’pool’ in the
distribution of investments and wages that this predicts. This isn’t
pooling in the sense in which this term in normally used. For every m
no matter how large, all workers and ﬁrms use monotonic strategies.
So in each ﬁnite game there is complete separation. However, when
the number of workers and ﬁrms is large, the equilibrium investment
rises very quickly with type at ﬁrst, then rises quite slowly for workers
whose types are close to that of the marginal worker. As a consequence
a lot of workers and ﬁrms appear to use the same wage and investment
in the limit.
5.1. How to use Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium. In the regular
case, truncated hedonic equilibrium provides a relatively simple way of
characterizing the limits of Bayesian Nash equilibria of the investment
game. The boundary condition provides a testable retriction on wage
and investment distributions since it suggests there should be some-
thing that looks like an atom at the bottom of the distribution. One
problem with using truncated hedonic equilibrium in this way is that
truncated hedonic equilibrium supports multiple outcomes. In the reg-
ular case, these outcomes are all similar with respect to the appearance
of the wage and investment distributions, and the eﬃciency of worker
investments. The point of this section is to show that these similarities
are robust enough to do simple comparative static exercises.
To begin, focus on the constant β in the deﬁnition. This constant
is required because the limit theorem only provides a bound on the
distribution of the n−m+1st order statistic that determines the worst
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ when it oﬀers 0 wage. Since the limit theorem doesn’t
provide an exact bound, truncated hedonic equilibrium is deﬁned for
all possible values of β < 1. However, since β uniquely determines the
minimum investment h0 of workers, the following result can be used to
provide some additional structure.






be a pair of truncated he-
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= 0. Now simply repeat the proof
of Proposition 7 to show that there is a unique h
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0. As in Proposition 7, ˆ w′
β (h) = ˆ w′ (h) for h > h
β
0,
from which the rest of the result follows. ￿
The implication of this theorem is that many of the interesting prop-
erties of the limits of Bayesian equilibrium for the investment game (at
least in the regular case) can be discovered by characterizing truncated
hedonic equilibrium in which β = 1. For example;
Proposition 9. There exist non-degenerate distributions G and F of
worker and ﬁrm types such that all workers make the same investment
and all ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage in the hedonic equilibrium in which
β = 1.
Proof. Since h0 > h∗∗, v (x) < ˆ w′ (h0) < c(h0)τ (y0) in the hedonic
equilibrium by condition 1 in the deﬁnition. Then there is an open
interval [y0,y1] for which v (π (y′)) < ˆ w′ (h0) < c(h0)τ (y′) for y′ ∈
[y0,y1). If the upper bounds of the supports of G and F are both less
than y1 and π (y1) respectively, the result follows. ￿
It is an immediate corollary of Theorem 8 that the same result is
true for any β < 1, though, of course, the wage and investment that
prevails in equilibrium will be higher the lower the value of β.
6. Conclusion
The paper shows the following things:
(1) The hedonic return functions ˆ h and ˆ w converge to continu-
ous functions that ’agree’ with one another for investments and
wages that lie in the support of the equilibrium distributions.
Agreement means that the wage that a worker expects to re-
ceive for a speciﬁc investment h′ coincides with the wage that
ﬁrms think they have to oﬀer to attract a partner of investment
h′;
14(2) The hedonic return functions below the support of the equilib-
rium distributions diverge;
(3) The lowest types of workers and ﬁrms pool together at low
investment and wage levels. These investments are too high in
the sense that a low type worker and ﬁrm who are matched
together will joint prefer a lower investment wage combination
than that which they are provided in equilibrium;
(4) The highest types of workers and ﬁrms match, make and invest-
ments and pay wages that are bilaterally eﬃcient. In this sense
they resemble the wages and investments that would prevail in
a standard competitive equilibrium.
These properties are combined in a equilibrium concept for a contin-
uum matching game in Peters (2006). There it is shown that limit
investments all exceed those that prevail in a competitive equilibrium.
7. Appendix 1:The Convergence Theorem
7.1. Characterization of Limits. In this section, we characterize the
functions ˆ w∞, ˆ h∞, w∞ and h∞ where ˆ w∞ and ˆ h∞ are the continuous
limits of some subsequence of equilibrium payoﬀ functions, while w∞
and h∞ are weak limits of some sub-sequence of equilibrium strategy
rules. It is shown that w∞ and h∞ are truncated hedonic equilibria.
Proof that are not explicitly included in the text are included in Ap-
pendix 2.
To begin, recall that τ (1 − G(y0)) = 1. Deﬁne h0 ≡ h∞ (y0) and
w0 ≡ w∞ (x) and refer to these as the lowest investment and wage that
are realized in the limit.3 We begin with some intuitively straightfor-
ward results. The proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 10. h∞ (y′) = h∗ (y′) for each y′ < y0.
Only the highest m worker types will match. The probability that a
worker with type y′ < y0 will be one of the highest m worker types goes
to zero with m. Since the worker shouldn’t expect to match, there is
no point making an investment beyond that which is privately optimal.
The next Lemma is a consequence of the fact that the equilibrium
return function must separate the types below and above y0.
Lemma 11. For each h′ ∈ [h∗,h0], ˆ w∞ (h′) − c(h′,y0) = −c(h∗,y0)
3This is an abuse of language in a number of ways. First, when there are ﬁnitely
many players, equilibrium strategy rules are monotonic and continuous, so all wages
and investments above w∗ and h∗ are in the support of the equilibrium strategies.
Second, by weak convergence, the limit of type y0’s equilibrium investment will be
less than or equal to h0.
157.2. Hedonic Equilibrium. Each of the payoﬀ functions ˆ wm and ˆ hm
is a hedonic return function. One obvious reason that they don’t look
like Rosen’s hedonic return function is that there are two such functions
instead of one. The next two theorems show how these two are recon-
ciled in the limit. They show how a Rosen like hedonic return function
can be constructed from limits of ﬁnite payoﬀ functions. They also
show how to use this limit hedonic function to check whether strategy
rules could qualify as limits of sequences of equilibrium strategy rules.
Lemma 12. For each y′ ≥ y0, limm→∞ ˆ wm (hm (y′))−c(hm (y′),y′) is
equal to maxh ˆ w∞ (h) − c(h,y′).
This Lemma says that if we knew the limit of the return function that
the worker faced in the Bayesian equilibrium, then we could reconstruct
the weak limit of his strategy rule by ﬁnding his best outcome on this
return function.
For the next Lemma, deﬁne for each y ≥ y0, π (y) = {x : τ (1 − G(y)) = F (x)}.
We refer to a seller of type π (y) as the hedonic partner of a worker
of type y. The next Lemma shows how to construct the limit return
function from the weak limits of the strategy rules and the hedonic
partner function.
Lemma 13. ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y′)) = w∞ (π (y′)) for each y′ ≥ y0.
Parallel arguments establish exactly the same results for ﬁrms:
Lemma 14. (i) for each w′ ∈ [w∗,w0], v(x)ˆ h∞ (w′)−w′ = v (x)ˆ h∞ (w0)−
w0;
(ii) for each x′ ≥ x, limm→∞ v (x′)ˆ hm (wm (x′)) − wm (x′) is equal to
maxw v (x′)ˆ h∞ (w) − w;
(iii) ˆ h∞ (w∞ (x′)) = h∞ (π−1 (x′)) for each x′ ≥ x.
One ﬁnal Lemma is important in the description of equilbrium.
Lemma 15. h0 > h∗ (y0) and w0 > w∗ (x).
7.3. A Bound on the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm with the lowest wage.
This section provides the theorem that determines h∞ (y0) and w∞ (x).
When the worst ﬁrm oﬀers w∗ it will be the lowest wage ﬁrm with
probability 1, since the equilibrium strategy wm is strictly increasing
for every m. As a consequence, the worst ﬁrm will match with the
worker who has the n − m + 1st lowest investment with probability 1.
Consider any investment h′ that lies between h∗ and h∞ (y0). This
investment will result in a match with some ﬁrm if and only if it exceeds
the n − mth lowest order statistic of the investment of the other n − 1
16workers. Let Prm
n
˜ hn−m:n−1 ≤ h′
o
be the probability with which this
order statistic is less than h′.
Lemma 16. Prm
n
˜ hn−m+1:n ≤ h′
o
converges pointwise (hence weakly)
to Prm
n
˜ hn−m:n−1 ≤ h′
o
as m goes to inﬁnity.
We now prove the main characterization result in the paper. It
bounds the payoﬀ any ﬁrm receives by oﬀering the lowest wage w∗.
Lemma 17. The expected investment of the partner of a ﬁrm who






′d ˆ w∞ (h′)
w0
where as above h0 and w0 are the lowest investment and wage that are
realized in the limit.
Proof. The limit payoﬀ associated with any investment h′ ∈ (h∗,h0)
lim










where W m (h′) is the expected wage the worker receives conditional on










The function hm (y) is continuous and monotonically increasing for each
m. So for any investment h′ ∈ (h∗,h0), there is a unique worker type
ym such that hm (ym) = h′.
A worker of type ym ﬁnds a job if and only if n − m or more of the
other workers have types less than ym, so







where, as above, γk (ym) is the probability that exactly k of the other
workers have types below ym.
By standard properties of the binomial distribution (and the fact that
E ˜ wt+1:m is a non-decreasing sequence), W (hm (ym)) is a non-decreasing
function. Fix y′ > y0. Since ym invests less than h0, while each worker
y′ > y0 invests more than h0 for m large enough, it must be that for
large enough m, ym < y′, so, again for large enough m, W (hm (ym)) ≤
W (hm (y′)). By Lemma 18, a worker of type y′ > y0 ﬁnds a job with
17probability 1 in the limit. So the conditional and unconditional wage
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o
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by stochastic dominance. ￿
8. Appendix 2: - Proofs
Lemma 18. Let y < ya < y and y < yb < y. The probability
that the number of other workers whose types are at least ya exceeds
n(1 − G(yb)) converges to one if yb > ya and converges to zero if
yb < ya. Similarly, the probability that the number of ﬁrms whose types
are at least xa exceeds m(1 − F (xb)) converges to one if xb > xaand
converges to zero if xb < xa.
Proof. The number of the n − 1 workers whose type exceeds ya is a
random variable with mean
(n − 1)(1 − G(ya))
and variance
(n − 1)G(ya)(1 − G(ya)).
As n grows large, this random variable becomes approximately normal
in the sense that for any x, the probability that the number of workers
whose type exceeds y exceeds x converges to the probability that a
standard normal random variable exceeds
x − (n − 1)(1 − G(ya))
p
(n − 1)G(ya)(1 − G(ya))
.
Evaluating this for x = n(1 − G(yb)), and replacing n−1 by n veriﬁes
that the probability that the number of workers whose type exceeds y
18is greater than m converges to the probability that a standard normal
random variable exceeds









which goes to minus inﬁnity when ya < yb and plus inﬁnity when
ya > yb. The probability then converges to one in the ﬁrst case and
zero in the second. The proof is identical for ﬁrms. ￿
8.1. Proof of Lemma 10.
Proof. The equilibrium strategies are monotonically increasing. So a
worker of type y′ < y0 will ﬁnd a job only if the number of other
workers who have types above y′ is less than m = n(1 − G(y0)). Let
ya = y′ and yb = y0 and apply Lemma 18 to conclude that the the
probability that the number of other workers whose types exceed y′ is
at least m = n(1 − G(y)) converges to one with m. It follows that a
worker of type y′ matches with very low probability when m is large,
and thus can’t proﬁtably invest more than h∗ in the limit. ￿
8.2. Proof of Lemma 11.
Proof. If ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y0)) − c(h∞ (y0),y0) > −c(h∗,y0), then for some
y′ < y0 and m large enough,




The equilibrium payoﬀ of a worker of type y′ is given by
ˆ wm (hm (y
′)) − c(hm (y
′),y
′)
By Lemma 10 and the continuity of the utility function, this converges
to −c(h∗,y′). As a consequence, a proﬁtable deviation must exist for
worker y′ for large enough m, a contradiction.
Similarly, if ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y0)) − c(h∞ (y0),y0) < −c(h∗,y0), a worker of
type y′ > y0 must ﬁnd it proﬁtable for large enough m to cut investment
to h∗. ￿
8.3. Proof of Lemma 12.
Proof. If the latter term is larger, there is immediately a proﬁtable
deviation from hm (y′) when m is large enough. If the former term is
larger, let h = limm→∞ hm (y′). From the contrary hypothesis, there is
some m0 large enough so that
ˆ wm′ (hm′ (y




ˆ w∞ (h) − c(h,y
′) + ǫ
19for each m′ > m0. Since the family of functions ˆ wm is equi-continuous,
there is for every ǫ′ > 0 a δ > 0 such that |h − h′| < δ implies that
| ˆ wm (h) − ˆ wm (h′)| < ǫ′ for all m. Find δ such that












′￿￿￿ ￿ < ǫ
for all m when
￿ ￿h′ − h
￿ ￿ < δ. Then choose m′ for large enough so that ￿ ￿hm (y′) − h











ˆ w∞ (h) − c(h,y
′)
Taking the pointwise limit gives a contradiction. ￿
The next theorem provides the ’hedonic’ part of the limit outcome.
Let y′ ≥ y0 and π (y′) = {x : 1 − F (π (y′)) = τ (1 − G(y′))}. The ﬁrm
type π (y′) is the ’hedonic partner’ of a worker of type y′, i.e., it is the
ﬁrm type such that the measure of the set of ﬁrms who have larger
types than π (y′) is equal to the measure of the set of workers who have
better types than y′. By deﬁnition, π (y0) = x.
8.4. Proof of Lemma 13.
Proof. In equilibrium, both workers and ﬁrms use monotonically in-
creasing strategies. So the kth lowest worker type will match with the
k − (n − m)
th lowest ﬁrm type. For any y′ ≥ y0, let x′ > π (y′). The
probability with which a worker of type y matches with a ﬁrm of type
x′or better is equal to the probability with which the number of ﬁrms
whose type is at least x′ exceed the number of workers whose type is at
least y′. Let π (y′) < x′′ < x′. By Lemma 18, the probability that the
number of ﬁrms with types above x′ exceeds m(1 − F (x′′))converges
to zero with m. On the other hand the probability that the number of
workers with types above y′ exceeds m(1 − F (x′′)) = n(1 − G(π (y′′)))
converges to 1 by Lemma 18, where π (y′′) = x′′. Hence, for any
x′ > π (y′), the probability with which a worker of type y′ matches
with a ﬁrm whose type is x′ or above converges to zero. A similar
argument establishes that the probability that a worker matches with
a ﬁrm whose type is less than π (y′) also converges to zero (or is zero
if y′ = y0 because π (y0) = x).
The functions h∞ and w∞ are both non-decreasing. So they are both
continuous except at countably many points. Then in any open interval
to the right of y′ and x′ > π (y′), there are points y′′ and x′′ > π (y′′)
such that h∞ is continuous at y′′ and w∞ is continuous at x′′. By
weak convergence, limm→∞ wm (x′′) = w∞ (x′′) and limm→∞ hm (y′′) =
20h∞ (y′′). As x′′ > π (y′′), by the reasoning in the previous paragraph,
lim
m→∞ ˆ wm (hm (y








′′) − c(h∞ (y
′′),y
′′)
The limit on the left hand side is a continuous function of type. Since
h∞ and w∞ are both right continuous, we have
lim
m→∞ ˆ wm (hm (y
′)) − c(hm (y
′),y
′) ≤ w∞ (π (y
′)) − c(h∞ (y
′),y
′)
Let h′′ > h∞ (y′). h∞ is a weak limit of a sequence of increasing
continuous functions hm. Then it is right continuous. As a result, there
must exist an open interval I
+
h′′ (y′) such for every y′′ in the interval,
y′′ > y′ and h′′ > hm (y′′) for inﬁnitely many m. A worker who invests
h′′ will match as if his type were better than y′′ . By the reasoning
of the previous paragraph, this means that investment h′′will lead to a
match with a ﬁrm whose type is at least π (y′′) > π (y′) with probability
converging to one with m. Since w∞ is non-decreasing, it can have at
most countably many points at which it is discontinuous. Hence for any
h′′ it is possible to choose y′′ such that w∞ (·) is continuous at the point
π (y′′). Since w∞ is the weak limit of the sequence of functions wm and
w∞ is continuous at π (y′′), w∞ (π (y′′)) is also the pointwise limit of
wm (π (y′′)). Then the payoﬀ to the investment h′′ must be converging
to something at least as large as u(h′′)(a − y′) + w∞ (π (y′′)). Since
I
+
h′′′ (y′) ⊂ I
+
h′′ (y′) when h′′′ < h′′, we can choose a decreasing sequence
(h′′
n,y′′
n) converging to (h∞ (y′),y′) for which this inequality holds, it
follows by the right continuity of w∞ that
lim
m→∞ ˆ wm (hm (y
′)) − c(hm (y
′),y
′) ≥ u(h∞ (y
′))(a − y
′) + w∞ (π (y
′)).
Putting these two arguments together gives
lim
m→∞ ˆ wm (hm (y
′)) = w∞ (π (y
′))
From the fact that h∞ has only countably many discontinuities, there is
for every y′ a y′′ > y′ arbitrarily close to y′ such that h∞ (·) is continuous
at y′′. Hence limm→∞ hm (y′′) = h∞ (y′′). Now using equi-continuity of
the family ˆ wm, for any ǫ, there is a δ such that




− ˆ wm (h∞ (y′′))
￿ ￿ ￿ <
ǫ for every m provided
￿ ￿ ￿˜ h − h∞ (y′′)
￿ ￿ ￿ < δ. Choose m′ such that
|hm (y
′′) − h∞ (y
′′)| < δ.
It follows that from m bigger than m′ | ˆ wm (hm (y′′)) − ˆ wm (h∞ (y′′))| <
ǫ. So limm→∞ ˆ wm (hm (y′′)) = ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y′′)). The result then follows
21from the fact that the limit on the left (equilibrium payoﬀ) is a con-
tinuous function of type, ˆ w∞ is continuous, and h∞ (y) is right contin-
uous. ￿
8.5. Proof of Lemma 15.
Proof. From Lemmas 13
ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y0)) − c(h∞ (y0),y0) = w0 − c(h0,y0).
From Lemma 11
w0 − c(h0,y0) = −c(h
∗ (y0),y0).
Similarly from Lemma 14
v (x)h0 − w0 = v (x)ˆ h(w
′) − w
′
for each w′ ≤ w0. By the deﬁnition of equilibrium, it must be that for
any y′ > y0,
ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y
′)) − c(h∞ (y


















′) − ˆ w∞ (h∞ (y
′)) < v (x)h0 − w0.
In words, this says that the market return function ˆ w(h) for h > h0
must lie below the indiﬀerence curve of a worker of type y0 through the
point (h0,w0) and above the iso-proﬁt curve of a ﬁrm of type x through
the point (h0,w0). Since this property cannot be satisﬁed at the point
(h∗ (y0),w∗ (x)), the result follows. ￿
8.6. Proof of Lemma 16.
Proof. Let ym be the (unique) type such that hm (ym) = h′. By Lemma
10, h∞ (y) = y∗ for every y < y0. Then for any h′ > h∗, there is m


















(n − m − 1)!(m − 1)!
G(z)
n−m−1 (1 − G(z))
m−1 g (z)dz
The logic in this expression is based on the idea that the probability
that ˜ hn−m+1:n ≤ h′ is equal to the expectation over all possible values
for ˜ hn−m:n−1 of the probability that at least one of the remaining m
























￿m (n − 1)!
(n − m − 1)!(m − 1)!
G(z)
n−m−1 (1 − G(z))
m−1 g (z)dz
Since the binomial term
(n−1)!
(n−m−1)!(m−1)!G(z)
n−m−1 (1 − G(z))
m−1 is a














n−m−1 (1 − G(z))
m−1 z ≤ ym
0 otherwise




As ψm (z) is bounded above by the constant function 1 and converges






ψm (z)g (z)dz = 0
Using this when taking the limit in (8.1) then gives the result. ￿
8.7. Proof of Lemma 2.
8.8. Lemma 19.







where α and h are deﬁned by (5.1) and (5.2) in the text.
Proof. From (5.1), h is a continuous function. From (5.2), α(·) is the
collection of points at which the iso-proﬁt curve through
￿
h(h′),w∗￿
cuts the indiﬀerence curve through (h∗ (y0),0). Let h2 be the invest-
ment such that
c(h2,y0) − w
∗ (x) = −c(h
∗ (y0),y0).
23(he,w∗)




˜ h α1(h2) h2
α(˜ h)
There are two distinct cases to consider depending on the slope of
iso-proﬁt curve at (w∗,h2). If the iso-proﬁt curve is ﬂatter than the






contains a point that exceeds h2. The function h is










is continuously decreasing as h′ increases. It fol-
lows from the mean value theorem that there is an h′ > h2 such that




is equal to h′.
The second possibility is that the iso-proﬁt curve is steeper than the
indiﬀerence curve at (h2,w∗). This would be the case if the privately





point h′′ > h2 as illustrated in the diagram below. Then as h′ increases


















somewhere in the interval [h2,h′′] follows from the mean value theorem.
The uniqueness of this point follows from monotonicity.
￿
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